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1. Interdisciplinary Prospects 
The dominant strains of corporate governance theory are far removed 
from the scholarship in employment and discrimination law. The two fields 
occupy distant workspaces and almost never talk to each other. The principal 
reason is that most corporate legal scholars have deliberately defined their 
field so that it addresses only a single, if crucial, subject: the allocation of 
control over firms between managers and suppliers of capital-investors. 1 So 
* Copyright 2004, Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center. This work was supported by the Georgetown-Sloan 
Project on Business Institutions. Thanks to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Kathy Stone, Margaret 
Blair, Mitu Gulati, Kim Krawiec, participants of the Washington & Lee Symposium on Critical 
Race Theory, the NYU Conference on Behavioral Analyses of Workplace Discrimination, and 
faculty workshops at Georgetown and the University of North Carolina for their encouragement 
and suggestions. 
1. For the most recent celebration of this perspective, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) ("There is no longer 
any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-
term shareholder value. "). 
1615 
HeinOnline -- 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1616 2004
1616 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1615 (2004) 
restricted, the field leaves to others the task of thinking about the legal 
relationships between the firm and other stakeholders, including those who 
supply its labor. 
Some corporate scholars chafe under this restricted vision and seek to 
redefine the boundaries of corporate law so as to encourage2 --or in some cases 
even require3-the board of directors to take into account the interests of 
employees, bringing employment law and corporate law into closer contact. 
But their project has yet to gain anything close to the upper hand. Some of the 
resistance is no doubt ideological-there is a strong conservative streak within 
the community of corporate scholars, and many of the critics of the narrow 
vision of corporate law have an openly progressive agenda. I suspect, though, 
that others fear that the field will lose its intellectual specialty if it expands too 
far in the direction of open-ended constructs like "team production,,4 or 
"connected contracts."s Yet regardless of the eventual scholarly consensus on 
whether corporate law should shift away from exclusive attention to investor 
interests, the corporate theory informing that inquiry uses a much wider-angled 
lens. Economists, whose ideas orthodox corporate law scholars habitually 
borrow, certainly· have no similar self-imposed limits on their interests. 
"Theory of the firm" work translates into a strong interest in employment 
contracts and structural relationships, resulting in a melding of economics and 
human resources.6 Economists studying the principal-agent problem have long 
2. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSffilLlTY: AMERICA'S NEWEST 
EXPORT 118-19 (200 1) (suggesting that the legal duties owed to shareholders by the board of 
directors should be relaxed to allow for greater concern for the corporation's other 
stakeholders). 
3. See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency 
o/Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 581,607-08 (2002) (broadening 
fiduciary duties to include a duty to employees); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital 
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 
CORNEU.L. REv. 899,950-53 (1993) (discussing actions taken by courts and legislatures that 
have allowed a board of directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders when important 
strategic decisions are made). An older strand ofthis thinking with European roots advocates 
the placement of labor representatives on corporate boards of directors. E.g., Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging 
Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 158-59 (1988) (discussing the presence of a labor 
representative on the board of directors as a possible way to protect labor's interests). 
4. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory o/Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REv. 247, 249 (1999). 
5. G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REv. 887, 894 (2000). 
6. See generally JAMES N. BARON & DAVID M. KREPs, STRATEGIC HUMAN REsOURCES: 
FRAMEWORKS fOR GENERAL MANAGERS (1999); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcONOMICS, 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1992). The "principal-agent" problem is one of 
the organizing ideas of this literature with an immense influence on the study of corporate 
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been interested in institutional arrangements that optimize the efficiency and 
productivity of the firm, something hardly limited to the resolution of conflicts 
between managers and investors. 
Since the early 1970s, work in corporate law has closely followed the 
interests of the economists, and it continues to follow in this direction.7 
Having gained some fluency with more expansive ideas about how firms are 
organized, scholars who think of themselves as "corporate" are seeing 
connections to other legal disciplines and are applying their skills and insights 
to problems in the borderland. I suspect that this expansion of interests will 
gradually transform" scholarship of the firm." Following the lead of corporate 
scholars like Margaret Blair, more attention will be paid to institutional 
arrangements-both contract and legal design-that facilitate productivity 
through more sophisticated approaches to human resources within 
organizations.8 We already see some signs of this increased attention in work 
on "virtual corporations,,9 and in David Millon's exploration of employment 
security inside the firm. 10 Stephen Bainbridge's writing on the connections 
between corporate decisionmaking and participatory workgroup 
governance law. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 
(1976) (describing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and 
management inherent in corporations as legal entities). 
7. One benefit from this movement is as an antidote to the myopia that comes from too 
much focus on the manager-investor connection. Simply by way of illustration, securities law 
scholarship looks at the matter of corporate discourse solely through the lens of management-
investor communications. Most corporate communications, however, have audiences other than 
investors that have not really been taken into account by securities regulation. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. 
REv. 87, 103~ (1999) (describing different types of corporate communications that are 
addressed to audiences other than the corporation's shareholders). 
8. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, 
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GoVERNANCE 74-80 (Margaret Blair & Mark Roe eds., 1999) 
(addressing various institutional arrangements designed to retain employees in an effort to retain 
firm-specific human capital). For a perspective outside the corporate perspective, see Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, 43 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 353, 376 (1993) (suggesting that unions be allowed to participate in strategic-
level corporate decisions so as to put labor on an "equal footing with all other contenders for 
power within the concern"); Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 
519, 568-72 (2001 ) (describing the new psychological contract as general training, market-
based pay, and networking opportunities instead of job security and internal promotions). 
9. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual 
Organization and Conflicting Governance Vectors, 59 U. Pm. L. REv. 759 (1998). 
10. See generally David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law 
Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 975 (1998). 
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arrangements II is another nice inquiry into this type of issue, as is-in a very 
different direction-research by Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas on the 
exercise of shareholder voting rights by labor unions and pension plans. 12 
This Article follows in that spirit. Once we open the corporate 
governance/human resources nexus to deeper inquiry, mutual scholarly interest 
in diversity and discrimination follows naturally.13 Firms have complex 
motives to take nondiscrimination and the promotion of diversity seriously. 
First, at least certain forms of discrimination are both unlawful and socially 
illegitimate and hence present threats of potential liability and injury to 
reputation. Second, human resources demands are such that attracting and 
motivating a diverse workforce is a competitive imperative. At the same time, 
however, offsetting economic forces. may exist that favor subtle forms of 
discrimination and hostility to diversity, even if intentional and overt racial or 
gender-based bias is mostly outdated. 14 In sum, the process of promoting 
11. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Finn, 21 J. 
CORP. L. 657, 680-84 (1996) (finding that participatory management improves corporate 
decisionmaking by efficiently channeling information obtained from low-level employees to the 
proper decisionmaker). 
12. See generally Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018 (1998). My 
suspicion is that a similar blending will occur along the boundaries between corporate law and 
intellectual property law, creating something of a triangulation of interests. 
13. I do not suggest that this particular nexus is entirely unexplored-scholarship is 
emerging on a number of dimensions relating to corporate law. E.g., Steven Ramirez, A Flaw in 
the SaT-banes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption, 77 
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 837, 837-40 (2003) (suggesting that boards of directors with diverse 
memberships are more likely to scrutinize the ·business because the members have fewer shared 
common characteristics); Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between 
the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 389,413-16 (2002) 
(advocating that unadjudicated and adjudicated discriminatory conduct be disclosed to 
investors). The economics literature on discrimination is extensive. See generally Joseph G. 
Altonji & Rebecca M. Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Markets, in 3C HANDBOOK OF 
LABOR EcONOMICS 3143 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1999); Brian L. Goff et al., 
Racial Integration as an Innovation: Empirical Evidencefrom Sports Leagues, 92 AM. ECON. 
REv. 16 (2002) (finding that sports tearns with racially integrated tearns performed better than 
nonintegrated tearns); Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, Job Discrimination, Market Forces and 
the Invisibility Hypothesis, 102 Q.J. EcON. 453 (1987) (finding that racial discrimination is 
caused in part by the lack of visibility of minorities in the labor market). 
14. See Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads: 
Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. 
REv. 402, 420 (1996) (stating that "groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out 
individuals who are different from the majority, unless this tendency to drive out diversity is 
managed"); see also Altonji & Blank, supra note 13, at 3168-76 (examining different models 
that explain statistical data suggesting the presence of ongoing discrimination in labor markets 
for women and blacks). 
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diversity and ending discrimination, whether to avoid liability or simply to 
remain competitive, is a difficult challenge faced by many firms. 15 It demands 
a close look at the efficacy of the internal decisionmaking and authority 
structures of the firm. 
Two recent papers piqued my interest in the connection between corporate 
governance and diversity initiatives. One, by Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, 
claims that critical race theory has much to gain from taking account of the 
managerial literature on the connections between efficiency and homogeneity 
inside the firm, and that law and economics, in turn, should take more seriously 
the dynamic social construction of race inside the workplace. 16 In other words, 
both genres would benefit from constructive dialogue. The other is Susan 
Sturm's thoughtful article on "second-generation" discrimination in 
organizational settings.17 At the risk of oversimplification, her point is that 
more subtle forms of employment discrimination cannot be eradicated 
successfully using old-style legal commands and controls. 18 Rather, courts and 
others wanting to promote diversity have to tweak organizational structures, 
setting in motion intrafum 'processes that spot and solve problems creatively 
and cooperatively. She points to experiences at companies such as Deloitte & 
Touche, Intel, and Home Depot as positive examples. 19 
Carbado and Gulati are pessimistic about countering the subtle pressures 
toward homogeneity except by fairly aggressive and vocal means.20 By 
contrast, Sturm's article strikes an optimistic note about possible ways of 
15. See Milliken & Martins, supra note 14, at 414-20 (finding not only that diversity 
increases the quality of group decisions but also that groups tend to become less diverse over 
time). 
16. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Oulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1761-64 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECfIONS,ANDANEW 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., Temple University Press 2002» 
(discussing the potential value of collaborative efforts between law and economics and critical 
race theory disciplines). 
17. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 460 (2001). 
18. Id. at 460-62. 
19. Id. at 491-519. 
20. They accept that firms are currently pressured to achieve some diversity but will 
respond by preferring minority group members who effectively deny their diversity and preserve 
the prevailing homogeneity. For a further exploration along these lines dealing with law firms, 
see David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for 
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate 
Bar, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1548, 1567 (2004) (stating that black lawyers were allowed into large 
corporate law firms so long as they "were functionally indistinguishable from the white lawyers 
that these institutions had always hired"). 
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addressing second-generation discrimination.21 While I hope Stunn is right, 
my intuition is that we need to understand the likely points of resistance to 
diversity initiatives more fully before making any confident judgment about 
what mayor may not work in a larger universe of flfOlS.22 Knowledge of 
organizational behavior should be useful here because, although some grounds 
for resistance will have distinct racial or gender overtones, others may fall into 
the more generic categories familiar to those who study how finns seek to 
promote any fonn of change or redirection among its employees. And the tone 
of much of the research about "top-down" efforts to change the embedded 
practices and directions within an organization is far from optimistiC.23 We 
have to understand the nature of the foreseeable. organizational resistance 
before we can deal with it. Through their darker lens, Carbado and Gulati 
explore some of these barriers but do not go far enough in playing out the 
likely consequences in terms of either the social or the political dynamics 
inside the finn. Unfortunately, the existing social science research does not 
tell us enough to be highly confident in assessing this problem. Hence, my 
contribution, also drawing from the melding of conventional and behavioral 
economics with the study of organizational behavior along the lines of much 
of the new institutional economics,24 is speculative. 
21. See generally Sturm, supra note 17. 
22. See Parshotam Dass & Barbara Parker, Strategies for Managing Human Resource 
Diversity: From Resistance to Learning, 13 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 68,72 (1999) (finding 
that successful implementation of diversity initiatives depends on the intensity of the external 
pressures for promoting diversity and the extent to which management has made diversity a 
priority). 
23. See, e.g:, CHRIS ARGYRIS, OVERCOMING ORGANIZATIONAL DEFENSES: FORMULATING 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 2-3 (1990) (reporting a study that showed that board members 
often believe that they have inadequate power to effecti veJy carry out their responsibilities and 
address potential management problems); Harvey Leibenstein & Shlomo MaitaI, The 
Organizational Foundations of X-Inefficiency: A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Argyris' 
Model of Organizational Learning, 23 J. BeON. BEHAV. & ORG. 251, 257 (1994) (finding that 
defensive behavior in management is responsible for suboptimal organizational performance); 
Nelson P. Repenning & John D. Sterman, Capability Traps and Self-Confirming Attribution 
Errors in the DyTUlmics of Process Improvement, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 265, 284-92 (2002) 
(arguing that attributing low productivity to flaws in the workforce rather than in the work 
processes causes potentially valuable process improvements to be overlooked). For a 
fascinating case study of a top-performing group's defense mechanisms and subsequent failure, 
see generally Paul Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. Bus. 
REv., Mar. 2001, at 51. 
24. For a good overview, see Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction to ORGANIZATION 
THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 3, 9 (Oliver Williamson ed., 
1990) (stating that economics and organizational theory are beginning to blend together). 
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A conversation between governance and discrimination scholars about 
what happens inside the firm will be productive only if there is an acceptable 
common rhetoric. Much of orthodox corporate law work is dominated by the 
metaphor of the firm as a "nexus of contracts. ,,25 . While that may be 
understandable as economists broadly understand the word "contract," it is 
jarring-and perhaps disturbing-when it takes on a normative connotation 
that assumes both legal enforceability and strong contractual "freedom. ,,26 A 
more inclusive description, from which much of what follows proceeds, is a 
"nexus of negotiations": The work among people within corporations is a 
series of negotiations that constantly redefine the situation in which the 
participants find themselves (negotiations of reality) and how they should 
respond (negotiations of power, authority, and action).27 Because reality 
changes constantly, any understandings are inevitably temporary, yet they 
plainly influence all the construals and choices that follow. One virtue of this 
metaphor is that it captures the firm's cognitive and cultural dimensions-
something that by all accounts is crucial to any deep understanding-whereas 
the contract metaphor does not. 28 
In tum, that metaphor also hints at how to be constructive. If the 
dominating image within the firm is the complex set of ongoing negotiations, 
then the central task of any lawyer, manager, or anyone else who wants to have 
an influence is to combine the roles of negotiator and mediator, rather than 
acting as an authority figure. Sometimes such a person can bargain for his or 
her own version of reality and power. But effective influence will come more 
often from being able to intervene in the negotiations among others in the firm 
in a way that facilitates a better outcome. Fortunately, much work in 
25. See generally Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1395 (1989). 
26. Hence, the endless debate among corporate scholars as to whether to allow contractual 
"opt-outs" of fiduciary responsibilities. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1365,1396-97 (1989). 
27. The classic texts in organizational behavior take this perspective almost as a given. 
See generally JAMES MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1988); JEfFREY PFEIFFER, 
MANAGING WITH POWER (1992); KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS (1995). For 
my effort to integrate this concept into a legal theory of why corporations commit fraud, see 
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Others), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997). 
28. On the influence of firm culture from the standpoint of transaction cost economics, see 
generally David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
POSITIVE POLITICAL EcONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); David M. 
Kreps, The Interaction Between Norms and Economic Incentives: Intrinsic Motivation and 
Extrinsic Incentives, 87 AM. EcON. REv. 359 (1997) (discussing the rationale for adhesion to 
norms by individuals). 
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psychology and economics teaches how to negotiate and mediate better,29 skills 
that would be useful in promoting organizational compliance with the law and 
with aspirations in promoting diversity and nondiscrimination. 
II. Diversity and the Corporate Promotion Tournament 
Discrimination can be found at any level of business organization, from 
the hiring of blue-collar workers to the high-level decisions on the composition 
of the senior executive team. Here, the focus will be on the middle and upper 
levels of the organization. The study of middle managers, especially, is a 
neglected subject in corporate governance and the "legal" theory of the firm. 30 
By all accounts, much of the real work of the organization occurs there. Just as 
important, senior managers ascend, at least initially, based on their performance 
as middle managers. A better understanding of this world is essential for both 
corporate academics and those interested in the fairness of patterns of hiring 
and promotion within corporations.31 
From an economics perspective, the standard question in studying 
diversity and discrimination in the firm is whether discrimination is, on 
average, efficient or inefficient in terms of productivity or profitability. If it is 
inefficient, as conservative critics of affirmative action habitually point out,32 
then there is the rosy possibility that patterns of discrimination should whither 
away as competition forces its elimination. But this will not occur if either of 
two conditions is present individually, much less simultaneously. One 
condition is insufficient competition, so that the residual rents can continue to 
29. See generally BARRIERS TO CONfUcr REsOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrowet al. eds. 1995); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable 
in Legal Education?, 6 HARv. NEG. L. REv. 97 (2001) (discussing an improved legal problem 
solving model which includes symbolic and logical thinking as well as "legal creativity"). 
30. See Gerard Hertig, Corporate Governance in the United States As Seenfrom Europe, 
1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 27,41 (noting that "[t]he role of middle management as such is 
largely ignored" in traditional studies of the internal organization of firms, which instead focus 
on the board and its committees or the CEO and top management). For a discussion of middle 
managers from the managerial literature, see generally Quy Nguyen Huy, Emotional Balancing 
of Organizational Continuity and Radical Change: The Contribution of Middle Managers, 47 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 31 (2002). 
31. See Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. EcON. LIT. 1382, 
1382-84 (1992) (discussing the importance of managing within the modem firm). 
32. E.g., Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 1311, 1321-25 (1989). 
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support a taste or habit for discrimination. The other condition is the 
persistence of positive efficiencies to discrimination, a possibility explored a 
few years ago by David Charny and Mitu Gulati33 and elaborated upon more 
recently by Gulati and Devon Carbado.34 They identify reasons why 
discrimination could be consistent with efficiency, including the possibility that 
interactions among employees are more productive when the employees share 
common traits-backgrounds, interests, patterns of speech-associated with a 
common race or gender.35 Trust, a crucial element of work within the firm, 
may develop more easily within a homogenous group. Without in any way 
doubting that this bias is the product of past discrimination and wholly 
illegitimate, the possibility that there are efficiencies to the perpetuation of bias 
calls for a different normative approach. Charny and Gulati, drawing from 
work by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, play out this possibility by 
thinking through its implications when employment patterns in a firm are 
organized in a tournament fashion--one where employees are matched against 
each other for eventual selection as one of the small group that becomes the 
senior management team with extraordinary status and compensation.36 In this 
setting, rational employees make investment decisions in their careers with a 
view toward the rewards associated with the large, but risky, winner's prize.37 
33. See David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and 
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57,77-83 (1998) (discussing reasons why an "economically rational" 
firm may discriminate). For a further extension of this view critiquing antidiscrimination law 
and finding positive externalities associated with a taste for homogeneity, see generally 
RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAWS (1992). 
34. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1813 (arguing that outsider groups, such as 
women and minorities, may feel the need to do extra "identity work" at their jobs to counter the 
stereotypes they perceive themselves subjected to, which may result in lost opportunities and 
increased burdens). 
35. Charny & Gulati, supra note 33, at 66-67. Because ofthis, they suggest, employers 
might rationally predict a nonminority candidate to outperform a minority one. See id. at 66 
(noting that the costs of integrating minorities into the workplace might arise from the 
reluctance of typical workers to cooperate with minority workers because of the different 
external characteristics of minorities). 
36. See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum 
Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. EcON. 841, 847 (1981) (discussing the relationship between 
compensation and incentives in relation to output and rank within the firm). 
37. In particular, a minority group member might rationally perceive discrimination and 
fail to invest as much in the skills necessary to win the tournament or else might be inclined to 
take excessive risk. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Differential Access to Opponunity and Power, 
in DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS: USING SOCIAL INDICATORS TO MANAGE SOCIAL CHANGE 
52 (R. Alvarez et al. eds., 1979) (proposing tools to measure whether there is a systematic 
disadvantage by race or gender within organizations by examining distributions of opportunity 
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I want to explore this same terrain but very differently. First, I want to 
relax the rationality assumption considerably, substituting assumptions drawn 
from psychology and behavioral economics. Second, I want to drill a bit deeper 
into the tournament structure of the ftrm's promotion practices to ask, as I have 
done in another recent work/8 a largely ignored question (at least by legal 
scholars) that is both central from a corporate governance perspective and also 
has implications for discrimination and diversity: Are there certain types of 
people, in terms of psychological makeup, who are statistically more likely to 
win the successive rounds of the internal promotion tournament so that the 
makeup of the ftnal winner's circle-the executive suite-is disproportionately 
populated by them? 
My prediction is that something other than pure-form rationality is likely 
to be the dominating trait among the survivors.39 That is, there may be certain 
"unrealistic" cognitive biases that are adaptive in tournament play and thus 
rewarded. If this hypothesis is right, we will have a very important corporate 
governance insight because the central task of governance is to constrain the 
behavior of those granted the largest amount of managerial discretion. Any 
special biases within this rarifted group need to be understood thoroughly in 
order to create the right institutional design.40 The task is to consider what 
those adaptive biases might be and then to think about the implications in 
terms not only of governance41 but also of diversity and discrimination. 
and power). 
38. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thennostat: Lessons from the 
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal 
Controls, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
39. Psychologists have long been aware of the economists' predictions and have studied 
the presence of cognitive bias in "expert" populations. While experts do indeed think differently 
and generally more effectively than the general population, they are by no means immune from 
bias. 
40. See MICHAELMACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN: THENEwCORPORATELEAoERS 15 (1976) 
(noting that the premise of the book is that in order to succeed, any strategy for social change 
must take into account corporate managers because of their influence on the work and lives of 
others). Maccoby's more recent prediction-which looks good in light of the recent financial 
scandals-is that highly narcissistic individuals are likely to become leaders of organizations in 
unstable market settings because of their ability to communicate a vision and confidence. 
Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable Cons, HARv. Bus. 
REv., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 69, 69-71. If Maccoby is right, corporate governance experts might 
want to take into account the propensity of narcissists to deny and hide the truth. 
41. Langevoort, supra note 38. 
HeinOnline -- 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1625 2004
OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO DWERSITY 1625 
Let us begin by taking a closer look at the structure of the tournament. 42 A 
naIve account of managerial hiring or promotion is that it is solely skill-
oriented. In this account, technical skills in doing a specific job dominate the 
evaluation process, defining the "merit" on which selection should be based. 
But the managerial literature emphasizes something very different. Much of 
the time, middle managers are organized into a work team that must, through 
the process of ongoing negotiation, solve a sequence of problems in carrying 
out its responsibilities and then negotiate with others the perception of how 
well or poorly the team performed.43 The common practice in most 
corporations is to rotate middle managers through many different work groups, 
evaluating each set of performances with a combination of individual and group 
assessments. Promotions within the organization are based on these 
evaluations.44 One author insightfully calls these "probationary crucibles,,45 
because they require iterated success if the person in question is to survive and 
thrive. 
If that is accurate, then we should observe an interesting tension in the 
hiring process. On one hand, the firm may want people who are entrepreneurial 
("self starters"), who have the kind of ambition, work ethic, and risk tolerance 
to perform well as individuals. These, after all, are characteristics associated 
with future leadership. At the same time, however, the firm will also recognize 
the need to find people who will fit well into the many teams to which they will 
be assigned. They will also, then, look for traits like loyalty and "being a team 
player," which are not perfectly consistent with the first group of traits. 
Put aside for a moment what kind of person best fits this mix ex ante. 
Hiring is a heuristic step,46 subject to rigorous, albeit subjective, empirical 
42. For simplicity, I will not discuss the role of selection of outsiders in the tournament 
structure and assume a contest only among insiders. The selection of outsiders complicates the 
matter but not in a way that would change the analysis considerably; outsiders are competing in 
tournaments of their own, presumably with similar structures, and by most accounts there is a 
bias to insider selection. E.g., William Chan, External Recruitment Versus Internal Promotion, 
14 J. LABOR EcON. 555, 556 (1996) (discussing the choice between internal promotion and 
external recruitment). 
43. See generally Richard A. Guzzo & Marcus W. Dickson, Teams in Organizations: 
Recent Research on Performance and Effectiveness, 47 ANN. REv. PSYCH. 307 (1996) 
(examining recent research on tearns and the factors that influence team effectiveness). 
44. For a useful overview, see generally R. D. Avery & K. R. Murphy, Performance 
Evaluation in Work Senings, 49 ANN. REv. PSYCH. 141 (1998). 
45. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 40 (1988). 
46. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 84 (discussing a method for choosing the 
most qualified candidate even in the face of embellishment of skills and abilities by the 
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testing. That is, the person is put into a team and evaluated periodically. 
Success means the possibility of promotion and assignment to another team 
with a higher level of responsibility; failure means scrutiny and a cloud over 
future prospects, if not immediate termination. There are multiple repetitions 
of this game-like process, eventually creating a small subset of survivors who 
succeeded repeatedly in play against many competitors. 
The standard-and doubtless accurate-account of discrimination in this 
setting is that these evaluations are biased at least in part because those in 
control (a heavily white male population) construct images over time of what 
success means simply by reference to historical pattems47 that, in tum, reflect 
historical domination. Given the "group" structure of much of the managerial 
workplace, white males might have a competitive advantage because of their 
comfort and familiarity with the language and norms of workgroup 
interaction.48 Indeed, there is a body of literature that links homogeneity with 
more efficient small group performance for many kinds of tasks.49 If this is the 
case, white males would have a continuing advantage simply because of their 
primacy in setting the cultural norms and their numerical domination of the 
status quo. 
That by itself is a plausible but relatively mild form of competitive fitness. 
After all, there is also research that shows the benefits of diversity in small 
workgroups in terms of quality of decisionmaking.5o Moreover, the supposed 
benefits of homogeneity gradually erode once a group is established, 
especially in a setting that values cooperation or otherwise attains a level of 
candidate or third-party "reformers"). See generally John Moran & John Morgan, Employee 
Recruiting and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 50 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 165 (2003). 
47. For a recent study on perceptions of men and women on what constitutes a good 
manager demonstrating this bias, see generally Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, 
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Female Authority, 26 PERs. & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 1315 
(2000). 
48. See generally Chamy & Gulati, supra note 33. For a good survey of this literature, 
see generally Francis Flynn et aI., Getting to Know You: The Influence of Personality on 
Impressions and Performance of Demographically Different People in Organizations, 46 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 414 (2001). 
49. See generally Karen A. Jehn et aI., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field 
Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 741-42 
(1999); Orlando Richard et aI., The Impact of Visible Diversity on Organizational Effectiveness: 
Disclosing the Contents in Pandora's Black Box, 8 J. Bus. & MGT. 265, 268-71 (2002); Anne 
S. Tsui et aI., Being Different: Relational Demography and Organizational Attachment, 37 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 549, 575 (1992). 
50. For an overview of the conflicting strands of research in this area, see generally Robin 
J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity Perspectives 
on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001). 
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interpersonal congruence.51 White males hardly have a monopoly on 
cooperative strategies--quite the contrary. In other words, any competitive 
resistance to diversity on these grounds should be comparatively fragile. 
My hypothesis, however, is that there is something deeper and more 
powerful going on inside the tournament. One crucial question, for instance, 
has to do with the appetite of executives for risk. Some people argue that the 
way to the top of an organization is to play it safe and engage in ingratiation 
and other influence tactics with one's superiors. There is something intuitive 
about this-but wrong. In highly competitive organizations, the safe strategy 
should be dominated by that of the "lucky risk-taker." The executive who takes 
significant risks will succeed repeatedly-simply by good fortune-some 
percentage of the time. Other times the risk-taking will lead to predictable 
failures. If we assume a large population in the organization, some small 
percentage of the risk-seekers will hit a lucky streak that will set them apart 
from both the risk-seeking losers and the play-it-safers. Association with 
unusually good outcomes does much for a career and can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy as the lucky person is identified as brilliant and given tasks 
more likely to bring further success.52 
If so, then we might look for biases or traits associated with an above-
average appetite for risk. Research in social cognition suggests that the two 
traits related to competitive success are a high degree of self-confidence and a 
higher than normal propensity to take risk. Self-confidence (optimism about 
personal efficacy) is associated with greater persistence, ability to persuade 
others, and the like.53 It also leads to the willingness-perhaps out of blissful 
ignorance-to be entrepreneurial and risk-seeking. When rewarded with 
51. See Jennifer Chatman & Francis Flynn, The Influence of Demographic Heterogeneity 
on the Emergence and Consequences of Cooperative Norms in Work Teams, 44 ACAD. MGT. J. 
956, 970-71 (2001) (finding that the negative effects of diversity on group functioning fade 
over time); see also Jeffrey T. Polzer et al., Capitalizing on Diversity: Interpersonal 
Congruence in Small Work Groups, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 296, 316 (2002) (noting that high 
interpersonal congruence moderates the negative effects of diversity on group functioning). 
52. For a theoretical exploration, see generally Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-
Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Q.J. EcON. 871 (2002). On the dangers of such 
attributions, see generally Malcolm Gladwell, The Talent Myth: Are Smart People Ove"ated?, 
NEW YORKER, July 22, 2002, at 28. 
53. See generally J. EDWARD Russo & PAUL SCHOEMAKER, DECISION TRAPs: TEN 
BARRIERSTOBRILLIANTDECIS10N-MAKINGANDHOWTOOVERCOMETHEM(1989);MARTINE.P. 
SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and 
Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGT. SCI. 17, 27-29 (1993); 
SIMON GERVAIS ET AL., OVERCONFIDENCE, iNvEsTMENT POUCY, AND EXECUTIVE STOCK (Rodney 
L. White Center for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 15-20), at http://papers.ssm.com 
Iso13/papers.cfm?abstract=361200 (2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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positive feedback, the optimists' self-confidence increases further, and with 
both the confidence and the performance, they are given even more attractive 
opportunities to succeed in future rounds. 54 
That research, in turn, would lead us directly to issues of diversity and 
discrimination. Both self-confidence and a propensity to take risks, according 
to psychologists, are unequally distributed along racial, cultural, and gender 
lines.55 Whether there are evolutionary or socially constructed explanations for 
this is controversial but unimportant for the descriptive purpose I have here. 56 
One can readily see how and why white males might have higher ratings on 
each of these "egocentrism" scales. And if these traits are associated with 
higher payoffs-that is, compensation of higher risk-taking and 
aggressiveness-we would expect the eventual tournament survivors to fall 
disproportionately into that profile. As a result, this would reinforce the 
success stereotypes used in heuristic settings like hiring and early-stage 
promotion. 
Another survivorship trait closely reflects what Carbado and Gulati were 
after and relates to the type of person who moves fluidly from point to point 
within the firm. The need for teamwork has led some commentators in the 
corporate field to predict that firms' internal norms, and presumably hiring and 
54. On the spillover from this self-confidence, see generally Mathew L. A. Hayward & 
Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid/or Large Acquisitions: Evidence a/CEO 
Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103 (1997) (finding that indicators of CEO hubris were related to 
high premiums paid for acquisitions). 
55. For evidence regarding gender differences from a financial perspective, see generally 
Brad M. Barber & Terrence Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender. Overconfidence and Common 
Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. EcON. 261 (2001) (documenting that men trade more aggressively 
than women); Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra Bernasek, Are Women More Risk 
Averse?, 36 EcON.INQUIRY 620 (1998) (finding that single women were relatively more risk 
averse than single men). On cultural differences, see generally Elke U. Weber & Christopher 
Hsee, Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, But Cross-Cultural Similarities in 
Attitudes Toward Perceived Risk, 44 MGT. SCI. 1205 (1998) (finding cultural differences in risk 
preferences associated primarily with cultural differences in the perception of risk rather than 
cultural differences in attitudes toward perceived risk). 
56. To be clear, I am by no means telling a story of "natural superiority." The tournament 
created by the probationary crucibles is plainly a social construct, and the choice to reward 
competitive success under a highly stylized set of rules of the game is far from inevitable. My 
point is that once the internal promotion structure of the firm has developed in the way it has 
(for whatever reason), it will tend to reward risktakers, which have an inflated self-confidence. 
If those traits are distributed unevenly, the system will be deeply biased, and the bias will be 
hard to eliminate without very aggressive intervention. Mild tweaking will not work, for 
reasons beyond conventional stereotypes. To put it another way, the system's largely automatic 
tilt favoring-both ex ante and ex post-the psychological traits unevenly distributed to white 
males creates one of the points of resistance that any effort to promote diversity will struggle to 
overcome. 
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promotion practices, will be heavily skewed to reward cooperators and weed 
out the selfish. 57 Based both on theory and anecdotal observation, this is 
unlikely-though not completely off the mark. Remember that on a regular 
basis managerial groups within the firm are disbanded so that loyalties must 
shift to an entirely new group, never allowing people's attachments to become 
too heavily encased in cement. Moreover, there is an important individual 
element to the tournament; a competitive manager has to be savvy enough to 
know how and when to defect quietly to impress superiors-that is, allow his or 
her individualized traits to be observed when that is desirable.58 In addition, of 
course, the manager must behave in a highly competitive, potentially aggressive 
fashion toward any "out-group"-including former colleagues, perbaps-that is 
perceived to be a rival. In this light, the image of the innate cooperator does not 
quite describe the person likely to thrive. 
Instead, the survivor is likely to be someone who can be both loyal and 
opportunistic, a mix that requires quite a bit of cognitive multitasking. 59 The 
egoist who simply fakes in-group loyalty is unlikely to survive scrutiny through 
many iterations in the crucible. There are too many higher-ups who can spot 
the selfishness and who fear that the quality would eventually pose a danger. 
Loyalty is a bona fide survival trait. But it is one that has to be moderated in 
those who want competitive success, and I would venture a guess that the 
moderation comes in the form of the cluster of traits that psychologists label 
"High Machiavellianism" or "high-Mach. ,,60 This kind of person deeply 
understands the need for mutual support and teamwork and rewards those who 
cooperate with intense loyalty as long as the cooperation has a positive payoff. 
On the other hand, he or she will defect without guilt when there is a 
compelling reason and the ability to do so without suffering a costly loss of 
reputation. To manage this conflict,61 the high-Mach is unusually adept at 
57. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Melvin Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in 
Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1717, 1719-21 (2001) (noting that diligence and honest performance 
of agents increases efficiency). 
58. Cf. CanicePrendergast,A Theoryof"Yes Men", 83 AM. EcON. REv. 757,769 (1993) 
(concluding that regarding workers on a subjective basis (effort or output) may induce them to 
distort their work products to reflect what they believe their superiors want to hear, which will 
result in inefficiencies in the form of less accurate work products as compared with workers who 
are induced to tell the truth). 
59. See Martin Kilduff & David V. Day, Do Chameleons Get Ahead? The Effects of Self-
Monitoring on Managerial Careers, 37 ACAD. MGT. J. 1047, 1055 (1994) (demonstrating that 
"high self-motivators" are more willing to change employers to get ahead and are more likely to 
be promoted). 
60. Samuel Bowles et aI., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 391. 
ECON. LIT. 1137, 1161-62 (2001). 
61. Psychologists tell us that the best actors are the ones who so internalize their roles that 
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rationalizing a shift in loyalties, something that both deflects guilt and protects 
one's reputation. Through the creative use of self-deception and influence 
techniques, this kind of person can be adaptively flexible and very persuasive to 
others. Self-interest and justifiable behavior blend seamlessly.62 Research 
suggests that high-Machs are disproportionately successful in sales and 
marketing63 and probably other highly competitive line and staff positions. 
They can be very "focused"-another favorite in the human resources 
playbook-precisely because of their disinclination to worry about 
relationships, commitments, or ethical distractions when there is good reason to 
move on. They are adept at emotional distance. 
A distinction between "grease" and "grit" captures this style of 
personality nicely.64 "Greasy" people are those who are ethically and socially 
nimble, able to make strong in-group connections-be stars at teamwork-
when it serves both their interests and the group's interest, as it so often will. 
But they can move away without the heavy baggage of regret when the 
economics dictate. Their skills accelerate the process of ongoing short-term 
negotiations (perceptual as well as contractual) and are thus favored inside 
the firm. In contrast, "gritty" people are those with the traits or preferences, 
whether ethical or social, that make internal negotiations more difficult 
because of the dissonance they introduce. If they slow things down in a high 
velocity environment, they will be disfavored. Again, over time, tournament 
survivors will disproportionately display favored tendencies. Grease wins 
over grit.65 
they have no conscious awareness that they are deceiving anyone in the first place. 
62. See George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed 
Trade-Offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDuer: BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH INTO 
BUSINESS ETHICS 214,221-23 (David Messick & Ann Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) (summarizing 
research on rationalization and noting the "[ilt is by now well established that people tend to 
conflate what is personally beneficial with what is fair or moral"). One mediating technique for 
rationalizing defection is to think of the victims as deserving it because of their own disloyalty 
to the group's goals. If that story is believed, others will not view the defection as inappropriate 
because the victims brought it on themselves. 
63. See Myron Gable & Frank Dangello, Locus of Control, Machiavellianism, and 
Managerial Job Performance, 128 J. PSYCH. 599, 600 (1994) (noting that managers with high-
Mach scores should be more effective than those with "lower-Mach" scores). 
64. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: 
Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron,-70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 968, 970 (2002) 
(discussing personality characteristics, such as a high degree of self-confidence and ethical 
plasticity, associated· with advancement up the corporate hierarchy). 
65. Obviously, too much grease is dangerous. What I am describing is a more controlled 
form of plasticity. 
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The diversity implications here are a bit more speculative but important. 
Going back to the point about small group efficiency, there is some reason to 
believe that the negotiation process is smoother when similar rather than 
different people are involved; if so, there is a small amount of grit added simply 
by being different. That certainly is the case if the person in question demands 
to be authentic in those differences,66 leading to the prediction that any diversity 
that is pursued will be women and minorities who mimic white male traits, 
including negative stereotyping of other women and minorities.67 The loyalty 
dimension is more ambiguous. If loyalty or connectedness were all that was at 
stake, then research would by no means suggest a white male advantage. But if 
the adaptive trait is something more plastic-strong, quick bonds, but only when 
delivering a positive payoff, coupled with an ability to be extremely aggressive 
vis-a-vis out-group members, including former associates-then that advantage 
might have at least a gender bias, if not a racial one. It is quite possible that white 
males on average score higher on the grease scale.68 
If the latter is true, then any survivorship bias derived from the first two 
traits, overconfidence and a taste for risk, is strengthened. As far as diversity and 
discrimination are concerned, we can draw a couple of inferences. First, the 
obvious: We now have further reason to fear that the closer we look at the 
internal workings of the firm, the more we see why, on average, white male traits 
might generate positive abnormal returns (at compound interest) the longer the 
tournament goes on, predicting survivorship quite apart from the effects of 
stereotyped perception. Moreover, any effort to eradicate this bias will encounter 
resistance on competitive grounds as a result. Hence, we cannot be overly 
optimistic about "tweaking" strategies when compared to more aggressive 
intervention to promote diversity and nondiscrimination. Second, we have a 
troubling externality as to the personality type most likely to hold the reins of 
power in a firm. If a bias toward overconfidence, risk-taking, and ethical 
plasticity-however efficient inside the tournament structure-is socially 
66. See Devon W. Carbado & G. Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 
1259,1263-66 (2000) (discussing the costs associated with asserting individual characteristics 
that are contrary to the work identity); Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1587 (noting that "conflicts 
and communication issues" impact diverse groups). 
67. See generally Naomi Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or Falling Apart: In-Group 
Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual 
Mobility, 72 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 617 (1997). 
68. See Linda K. Stroh et al., All the Right Stuff: A Comparison of Female and Male 
Managers' Career Progression, 77 J. APP. PSYCH. 251,257-58 (1992) (noting that women who 
have equal qualifications and follow similar career paths as men continue to receive lower 
salaries). 
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troublesome because of the externalities associated with the kinds of business 
decisions the bias generates, then diversity initiatives might have a positive effect 
by neutralizing some of this bias. 
III. Finn-Wide Efficiency 
What was suggested above is a form of adaptation within the internal 
promotion structure of the firm. Certain traits lead to survivorship, meaning that 
there is a positive payoff to the individual who possesses them inside internal 
labor markets. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean .that the 
same structure-favoring those who exhibit excessive optimism, have a relatively 
high risk-tolerance, and are ethically flexible-has a positive payoff for the 
company as a whole.69 Perhaps, as Bob Cooter and Mel Eisenberg argue,70 firms 
would prefer internal norms that reflect more stringent habits of character and 
integrity and thus would seek to counter the biases built into the tournament 
structure by revising the firm's hiring and promotion practices. 
While there is no hard evidence one way or the other, there is no reason to 
predict with any confidence that the tournament structure I have described-
however troubling from a societal perspective-is maladaptive at the level of the 
firm. Translating individual personality traits into indicators of finn-wide 
performance is difficult, of course/1 but the first two traits described earlier, 
optimism and high risk-tolerance, are likely to have the same kinds of positive 
payoffs when embedded in the firm's senior management culture with respect to 
competition among firms as it does for managers internally.72 That is, a finn that 
perseveres, acts aggressively, and takes calculated risks will, on average, be 
69. It is well recognized that organizations have to counteract the cognitive biases of 
individual employees to some degree. See, e.g., Chip Heath et aI., Cognitive Repairs: How 
Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 REs. ON ORO. 
BEHAV. 1,6-7 (1993) (noting how individuals often attribute their success to stable, internal 
factors, while attributing their failures to unstable, environmental factors and discussing the 
need for organizations to counteract or repair this self-serving bias to ensure that success is not 
simply due to luck or other external factors). 
70. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 1726-28 (noting that screening and 
filtering are more effective methods for assuring good agent character than education or 
socialization). 
71. See Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: Anv ANCES IN THEORY AND REsEARCH 350, 35~51 (J. Keith 
Murnighan ed., 1993) (noting the lack of research into using psychological theory to understand 
organizational-level behavior). 
72. See Langevoort, supra note 27, at 152-56 (discussing adaptive biases, particularly the 
relationship between optimism, risk-taking activity, and success). 
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rewarded. While there may not be a tight coupling between internal promotion 
policies and the establishment of finn-wide habits, one should not bet against it. 
As to ethical plasticity, the conclusion is much the same. Finns need to be 
sensitive to external demands for legitimate behavior in setting policy but are 
more profitable, on average, if they construe what is legitimate with a self-serving 
bias. Of course, if we are right about whom the survivors of the firm's internal 
promotion tournament are likely to be, this plasticity will come naturally. 
N. Self-Serving Resistance 
Now let us turn to what the foregoing means for nondiscrimination. We 
cannot, in the name of diversity, claim that these deep biases need to be 
eradicated simply to gain firm-wide efficiency. We should not dismiss that 
possibility, but the affirmative case is difficult to demonstrate to anyone not 
predisposed toward it. The likely payoffs to homogeneity are too strong. Thus, 
any effort to push diversity must be based on other reasoning. Here we return 
to the possibilities mentioned earlier. One is because the law demands it-a 
proposition undermined if the law takes a strong stand only against overt 
discrimination, as it does today.73 Another is because diversity makes the 
company more legitimate in the eyes of key constituents. The third is because 
diversity may be a,business necessity in order to attract the quantity of skilled 
managers needed to survive or prosper. Initiatives driven by these forces are 
what Susan Sturm explores so well in her article.74 
If there is one thing clear in the business literature, it is that senior 
management errs severely if it assumes that because it is convinced that a 
certain initiative is good for the firm, employees will see it the same way. Of 
course, executives realize that employees may resist an initiative because it is 
not in their self-interest. But they assume that employees are aware of their 
selfishness, privately at least, and so assume that management has the moral 
high ground in the ensuing battle and can use guilt as a tactic for overcoming 
73. See Linda Hamilton Krieger. The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 
1247-48 (1995) (suggesting that many biased employment decisions result from a variety of 
unintentional categorization-related judgment errors rather than. as legal interpretation of Title 
VII assumes, a conscious discriminatory purpose, and arguing that, if Title VII is to retain its 
effectiveness, this legal assumption must change). See generally Charles R. Lawrence ill, The 
Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 122,124-25 (John J. Donahue ill ed., 1997). 
74. See generally Sturm, supra note 17. 
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the employees' resistance. Top-down initiatives often have a preachy quality to 
them.7S 
Research counsels otherWise. As with many people, resistant managers 
are likely to convince themselves that what they believe is right and reasonable 
and denigrate senior management's motives to the extent that they are 
threatening.76 Much work on affirmative action falls into this category; people 
opposed to it both articulate and convince themselves that they have the moral 
high ground. As Christopher Federico and Jim Sidanius claim,77 this may be 
self-deception-the principled objections really do reflect a self-serving desire 
to maintain dominance-but it is no less convincing to the holder of that 
viewpoint. Attitude change is unlikely. I suspect that the same would be true 
of insistence to white or male manag~rial employees that a diversity-based 
initiative is a business necessity. That is just as likely to provoke the belief that 
the initiative is being imposed for illegitimate political reasons or external 
pressures that will not serve the company's best interests. It will take better 
advocacy than that to reduce resistance or induce cooperation.78 
75. As with many corporate governance and management-style activities, these may be 
easy to promote disingenuously. See, e.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, The Symbolic 
Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions, 43 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 127, 129-35 (1998) (discussing a corporate trend towards announcing long-term 
incentive plans thought to focus executives on longer-term goals but making either no 
implementation or only trivial implementation in order to gain favorable market treatment at 
minimal cost and risk). For a critical exploration of compliance initiatives along these lines, 
including those in the nondiscrimination area, see generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic 
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing 
that internal compliance programs and corporate conduct codes may lead to under enforcement 
and under deterrence). 
76. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining the self-serving 
rationalization process that some employees experience in pursuit of success). 
77. See generally Christopher M. Federico & Jim Sidanius, Racism, Ideology and 
Affirmative Action Revisited: The Antecedents and Consequences of "Principled Objections" to 
Affirmative Action, 82 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 488 (2002). 
78. In addition, political ideology can come into play in business settings. A disposition 
to conservatism inclines people to reject psychologically grounded "excuses" for decisions in 
favor of an inflated vision of merit and just dessert. In other words, conservatives tend to doubt 
the existence and relevance of cognitive biases. See Phillip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and 
Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the 
Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293, 320-24 (2000) (discussing the correlation between political 
viewpoint and management style). 
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V. Constructive Intervention 
Having suggested something about the likely depth of resistance diversity-
based initiatives are likely to face in many fIrms, I now want to return to 
Sturm's account of the success of "problem-solving" kinds of programs at 
Deloitte, Intel, and Home Depot. My purpose here is to push harder on the 
question of what forces might have contributed to the apparent success of these 
programs and connect some possible answers to broader issues that have 
emerged at the corporate governance and human resources nexus. 
At the risk of clinging too long to the pessimistic side of the story, I will 
start with an observation made by Sturm's interviewees twice in her account: 
Corporate executives do not "purchase" diversity-based compliance programs 
willingly, even when persuaded in the abstract of their value. It takes the threat 
of a lawsuit or some forceful top-down command to get their attention.79 The 
two people quoted both identify "short-term" performance pressure on line 
managers as the motivating reason to pursue these programs.80 This concern, of 
course, goes far beyond diversity-based compliance to an issue at the heart of 
corporate governance. At the highest levels of the fIrm, is there a systemic bias 
toward hitting quarterly earnings and revenues targets that distracts 
management from longer-term investments? In the empirical literature, this is a 
matter of some controversy but is at least a possibility.8) 
My sense is that pushing down the responsibility for diversity and 
nondiscrimination to the more local level exacerbates this possibility. A 
delegation of this kind would not be surprising; most human resources issues 
79. See Stunn, supra note 17, at 532-33 (describing a suit brought by African-American 
employees getting the attention of Southern California Edison). 
80. Id. at 499 n.145, 543 n.314. Psychologists and econoinists have uncovered much 
evidence showing that we are already biased toward the short-tenn. See, e.g., Shane Frederick 
et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. EcON. LIT. 351, 366-77, 
389-93 (2002) (discussing alternative models to predict economic decisions over time and how 
various personality traits and life experiences may combine to influence future choices). 
81. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of 
Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. EcON. 655, 661-76 (1989) (arguing that greater 
managerial concern over stock prices leads to a greater tendency to take a short-tenn myopic 
approach toward investing corporate funds); Anjan V. Thakor,lnvestment "Myopia" and the 
Internal Organization of Capital Allocation Decisions, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 129, 143-45 
(1990) (arguing that biases toward short-tenn investments are imposed on corporations by the 
capital market's preference toward current shareholders). From a legal perspective, see 
generally Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 
UCLA L. REv. 277 (1990) (critiquing the presumption of overly risk-averse corporate behavior, 
advocating policies that encourage corporations to behave to maximize theoretical perfect-
market stock value, and eliminating accounting-based biases). 
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are implemented at the middle-management level, with only general statements 
of direction from above. If middle managers have discretionary responsibility 
over implementing diversity, then the simple question is whether the way in 
which we measure their success encourages long-term investments. On a 
variety of grounds, there is reason to doubt it. Most obviously, if their 
performance is based on easily generated financial metrics, long-term diversity 
payoffs are unlikely to be captured as anything but a drag. 82 Some of the 
managers Sturm interviewed made this point explicitly.83 What I would add 
here is the exacerbating effect of the tournament structure I emphasized in the 
previous sections. If managers are rotated frequently through different 
assignments, with promotion decisions based on methods that overvalue the 
most recent experience, then there is an additional reason to expect disinterest 
in diversity investments. Even if they do payoff eventually, it will become too 
late to have an effect on the career of the innovator and be easy for the 
innovator's successor to appropriate as his or her own. if that is the incentive 
structure, then middle managers will---through rationalization and self-serving 
inference-attend to other priorities and ignore the generalized direction from 
above. In other words, the tournament structure contributes to line-level short-
termism, encouraging the use of grease and an aversion to grit in local 
decisions. 
In Sturm's descriptions of Intel and Deloitte, in particular, we see different 
kinds of interventions designed to trump this effect. Deloitte's program, 
designed to increase the number of women in high-powered consulting 
positions at the firm, begins by eschewing localism-it was distinctly a top-
down initiative managed by the firm's chief executive, albeit with widespread 
involvement from subordinates in its formulation (a subject explored in more 
detail below).84 More importantly, perhaps, it worked toward the development 
of highly objective benchmarks that line managers were instructed to meet.85 
Though not quotas, I suspect that the benchmarks came close to being that. In 
sum, this was a very aggressive intervention that worked directly at the 
incentive level within the firm. 
Intel's intervention was different and somewhat softer.86 Its design was 
to bypass line managers by creating a separate and powerful locus of 
82. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 543 (discussing corporate tendencies to ignore issues that 
do not impact the short-term bottom line). 
83. Id. at 543 n.314. 
84. See id. at 492-99 (describing Deloitte & Touche CEO Mike Cook's personal 
involvement in the efforts to increase retention of women). 
85. Id. at 496 n.126. 
86. See id. at 499-509 (describing Intel's Human Resources reorganization). 
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authority-the human resources and legal staffs-that had the ability to 
intervene to improve the quality and fairness of work for its increasingly 
diverse, highly skilled employees. What is noteworthy here is the power. In 
contrast to monitoring and compliance groups in many other firms,87 this group 
could override self-serving line-manager decisions. Interestingly, Intel does not 
limit this to employment practices; its antitrust compliance program is also 
unique in its aggressively interventionist tacticS.88 
Both Intel and Deloitte depend on one thing in particular to make these 
interventions effective: information. Sturm rightly emphasizes the importance 
of this.89 If I am right that there is an embedded efficiency bias toward grease 
rather than grit, which diversity initiatives threaten, then the system's 
inclination will be to obscure practices that contribute toward discrimination 
rather than to expose them. Those with power have no incentive to generate 
hard data but rather will try to rationalize the process with window-dressing 
symbols of compliance designed to deflect attention away from any embedded 
problems.90 Intel and Deloitte used sophisticated management information 
system (MIS) techniques to monitor outcomes, thereby avoiding reliance on 
self-serving statements of compliance from below. 
This brings us to an important connection between corporate governance 
and human resources and a promising area for future inquiry. There is a 
familiar phrase that "you manage what you measure. ,,91 In a system in which 
metrics are almost exclusively in the form of conventional financial accounting, 
the incentives are biased toward meeting and exceeding those accounting 
benchmarks used for promotion and compensation, in whatever time periods 
chosen for those measurements. We understand the imprecision or artificiality 
of many of these measures yet still use them because they are conventionally 
understood as the best measures available. 
87. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 101 (describing the optimal strategy within 
compliance structures of reliance on line supervision monitoring, "backed up by low-
powered ... compliance specialists"). 
88. See David B. Yoffie & Mary K wak, Playing By the Rules: How Intel Avoids Antitrust 
Litigation, HARV. Bus. REv., June 2001, at lt9, 120-21 (describing Intel's antitrust law 
compliance strategies in which internal standards are designed to avoid both clear violations and 
legal "gray-areas"). 
89. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 519-20 (discussing traits the successful case studies have 
in common). 
90. See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of 
Organizations, 23 ANN. REv. Soc: 479, 487-92 (1997) (describing the behavior of materialistic 
corporations). 
91. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure. 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1335, 1335 (1996) (discussing the effects of 
financial disclosure on corporate management). 
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What accountants, business people, and others interested in corporate 
governance are now coming to appreciate is that advances in information 
technology invite a new search for better metrics of corporate performance. By 
all accounts, conventional accounting and MIS fail to capture the connection 
between human resources activities within the firm and the firm's productivity 
and also fail to capture practices that lead to innovation and the creation of 
intellectual property. But, a good bit of recent work makes these measurements 
more sophisticated.92 As these metrics develop, we should see more sunlight 
shed on human resources practices-including diversity-based ones-that will 
afford us a greater understanding of their efficiency implications. 
This, in tum, will bring human resources practices closer to the orthodox 
concern of the corporate law scholar, the capital marketplace. Over the last few 
years, a number of people interested in corporate disclosure have been 
considering the possibility that, if standardized metrics that capture human 
resources-and intellectual property-practices within the firm can be 
developed, they should be made publicly available, just as financial accounting 
data is today.93 Thus, investment decisions would be affected by-and reward 
or punish--either superior or inferior performance on these standards. While I 
remain skeptical that objective metrics for all corporations will be easy to 
derive,94 I have no doubt that the exploration is worthwhile and, if successful, 
would have a dramatic influence on behavior. 
If so, we could indeed learn much about diversity and nondiscrimination. 
We could find more sensitive correlations between diversity initiatives and 
measures of productivit):'. To be sure, this may not bring welcome news; in 
other areas of corporate governance, studies often failed to support the 
connection between seemingly desirable organizational changes-like 
independent boards of directors95-and firm profitability. We might, in other 
92. See, e.g., Jacques Mairesse & Pierre Mohnen. Accounting for Innovation and 
Measuring Innovativeness: An Illustrative Framework and Illustration, 92 AM. EcON. REv. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 226, 226-27 (2002) (proposing an accounting framework for innovation). 
93. SeeUNSEENWEALTII: REPoRTOFTIlEBROOKINGsTASKFoRCEONINTANGffiLES57-71 
(Margaret Blair & Steven Wallman, co--chairs, 2(01) (recommending a regulatory framework to 
expand economic reporting to include intangibles in a regular and regulated manner). 
94. As with many corporate governance and management-style activities. these may be 
easy to promote disingenuously. See, e.g., Westphal & Zajac. supra note 75. at 129-35 
(discussing a corporate trend toward announcing long-term incentive plans thought to focus 
executives on longer-term goals but making either no implementation or only trivial 
implementation in order to gain favorable market treatment at minimal cost and risk). 
95. See, e.g .• Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921. 944-50 (1999) (finding no positive 
correlation between an independent board of directors and firm profitability). For a study of 
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words, find that grease-laden firms are efficient competitors, so that diversity 
has to be justified as good for the public rather than good for business. 
Whatever the eventual outcome of this public disclosure inquiry, Sturm is 
right that private data-tracking efforts, which can be customized on a firm-by-
firm basis, are the key to any effort to overcome internal resistance to diversity 
initiatives.96 Once senior management decides to commit the firm to diversity, 
objective performance indicators are essential to expose the self-serving 
rationalizations bound to emerge from below. Information alone, however, is 
no solution. If there is resistance to the implementation of diversity initiatives, 
it must be countered. Data provides crucial intelligence, but it takes the 
exercise of either power or persuasion-skillful negotiating-to obtain good 
outcomes. 
The Deloitte experience exemplifies the deft use of power.97 The chief 
executive officer took personal control over the implementation of the firm's 
diversity task force, which in tum set fairly specific performance benchmarks 
bolstered by detailed information gathering to monitor compliance. That, I 
suspect, is a rather rare occurrence. Most CEOs are unwilling to take that sort 
of risk or devote enough time and attention to the task. They may take 
symbolic steps along those lines, but without substance. Indeed, if I am right 
about biases in the promotion tournament that lead to an excess of ethically 
plastic Machiavellianism in the executive suite, we have no reason to expect a 
genuine commitment to the effort as opposed to a strategic preference for 
maintaining as greasy a system as possible consistent with whatever 
prodiversity needs the firm faces. And, whatever commitment there is might 
not be long-lived. 
Even where there is the exercise of top-down power, some unintended 
consequences are likely. Imagine that we have a CEO who is committed-
presumably for competitive reasons-to increasing diversity. As noted 
earlier, employees threatened by these initiatives are likely to feel no 
trends and fads in managerial behavior, see Mark J. Zbaracki, The Rhetoric and Reality oJTotal 
Quality Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 602, 612-29 (1998) (discussing the adoption of Total 
Quality Management programs at several institutions). Notwithstanding, managers are often 
highly evaluated and compensated for being on top of the latest "learning." See Barry M. Staw 
& Lisa D. Epstein, What Bandwagons Bring: Effects oJPopular Management Techniques on 
Corporate Performance, Reputation, and CEO Pay, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 523, 542-44 (2000) 
(discussing positive correlations between implementation of popular business techniques, such 
as Total Quality Management, and CEO pay, regardless of actual business performance). 
96. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 519-20 (discussing traits the successful case studies cited 
have in common). 
97. See id. at 492-93 (describing the Deloitte CEO's personal efforts to address the 
company's gender problems). 
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gUilt in their resistance or opposition; they will rationalize their response in 
principled terms, however self-serving the underlying motivation. Any 
authoritarian effort to overcome this resistance, although possibly successful in 
forcing the desired outcome, is likely to lead to a reduction in the motivation 
and morale of the employees whose will was overborne. This is another reason, 
I suspect, that top-down initiatives are often more symbolic than real; many 
executives, especially in highly competitive firms, fear the indirect productivity 
losses that flow from the winning of the immediate battle. Internal motivation 
is one of the operational imperatives in many organizations and is not readily 
put at risk.98 
The more common technique for implementing a diversity initiative is to 
delegate it to some combination of legal arid human resources specialists, as 
Intel did. That is dangerous, of course, for it can mean a loss of authority, 
unless there is some mechanism by which the CEO stands behind this group 
(which just created an indirect form of what we have just discussed). In many 
industries, we observe relatively low-powered compliance groups, which are 
likely to police only for fairly egregious violations that unambiguously threaten 
the firm's self-interest. B~yond that, their task is to create the appearance of 
attention to legal norms to protect the firm from charges of wholesale 
indifference. It is largely window dressing. 
Sociologists, however, point out that this kind of impotence by design-
though probably common-is not inevitable. In a well-known series of 
articles, Lauren Edelman and her colleagues studied the implementation of 
EEOC directives in firms. Because EEOC directives are ambiguous except 
when directed at conduct that is blatantly discriminatory, firms responding to 
them have a range of possible responses:. One-found fairly often-was 
symbolic compliance without taking any steps that pose a serious threat to 
managerial discretion.99 But their field studies were not entirely pessimistic. 
98. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 96-99 (describing loss of motivation as an indirect 
cost imposed by conflict and hostility between employees and compliance officers). 
99. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation ojCivil Rights Law, 97 AM.J. Soc. 1531,1538-47 (1992) (arguing 
that managerial desire to simultaneously avoid the perceived negative impacts of equal 
employment opportunity law and to appear to be in compliance with the law encourages a 
strategy of emphasizing procedure over substance and appearance over reality); Lauren B. 
Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics oj Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers' 
Dilemma, 13 LAw & POL'y 73, 90-92 (1991) (analyzing strategies that various affirmative 
action officers adopt to cope with competing demands from minorities and administrators); 
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity oj Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as 
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406,445-49 (1999) (discussing how "rational myths" about the 
law in the employment practices context, as organizations seek the appearance of compliance, 
can become the economic and legal reality). 
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A natural consequence of delegating compliance to a professional group, even 
if it lacked power initially, was that the group would seek to expand its power. 
And, in the equal employment opportunity area, at least, such groups have been 
fairly savvy. 
One tactic is message sharpening. Where the law is relatively ambiguous, 
a professional group can claim exclusive expertise over the interpretive process 
and choose an interpretation that overstates the law's demands. 1oo With that 
interpretation as a club, the group gains more power simply because of the 
perception that the firm has no choice but to comply and must rely on the group 
to manage the compliance process. 
Professional groups within the firm also use· social networks to their 
advantage. By making allies with a variety of groups outside the firm 
(compliance officials in other firms, organizations devoted to promoting 
compliance, and others), the inside professionals have a couple of advantages. 
First, they gain support for their construals of the law' s demand~professional 
organizations can endorse aggressive readings of the law, which can then be 
cited internally as authority. Second, to the extent that other firms have 
engaged in stronger compliance steps, the professional network can identify 
and highlight them, creating pressure on others to conform. These professional 
networks have shown surprising strength in causing what sociologists <;all 
"mimetic" responses. 101 And once a few firms mimic the innovator, the 
pressure on the others increases that much more. 
Sturm's account of Deloitte's experience reveals a fairly savvy use of 
professional networking. 102 Outside organizations devoted to improving the 
status of women in business firms were involved in the design and monitoring 
of the Women's Initiative103-a classic use of a bonding device designed to 
increase the threat to the reputation of the company should there be any 
100. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat 
of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAw & SOC'y REv. 47, 57-62, 71-75 (1992) (discussing how the 
threat to employers from wrongful discharge suits has been exaggerated by misleading data and 
hyperbolic language, in part to increase demand for lawyers); see also Donald C. Langevoon & 
Roben K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 
5 S. CAL.INTERDISC. L.J. 375,392-99 (1997) (predicting that lawyers will often overstate legal 
risks to clients when giving legal advice because incentives to overstate far outweigh incentives 
to be accurate). 
101. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147,150-
52 (1983) (describing "mimetic" isomorphism as a result of responses to uncertainty that, along 
with coercive and normative processes, results in great similarities among institutions). 
102. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 498-99 (describing the use of external professional 
networking groups at Deloitte). 
103. Id. 
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backsliding. Sturm characterizes these external advisory groups as ones that 
both "provided a continual source of reflection and protected the process from 
internal capture."I04 Sturm's description of Home Depot relates a similar 
bonding effort using outside interest groups, largely a spillover from the class 
action that led to the reforms. 105 
I suspect that the clever inside group can sometimes even tum window 
dressing into substance. Imagine, as is probably fairly common, a diversity 
initiative by senior management designed to counter negative attention or a 
symbolic lawsuit, creating minimal interference with greasy patterns of bias 
deep within the company. One strategy would be to declare this program a 
model and invite close external scrutiny by the press, "interest groups, and 
others. That by itself probably would cause pressure to generate observable 
results. The risk, of course, is that senior management will consider this to be 
insubordination and punish the prodiversity group. If senior management is 
strongly opposed to substantial change, that risk will no doubt deter much 
experimentation. But this opposition might be softened by a gradual approach 
and a careful attribution of credit for the initiative to the CEO or board 
members. This is simple influence utilizing cognitive dissonance. 106 Inducing 
small steps of commitment by the CEO-bolstered by positive feedback-can 
provoke an attitude shift that may lead to more substantial support for the 
initiative. 107 
The point here goes back to my metaphor of the firm as a nexus of 
negotiations. The promotion of diversity mayor may not hold a position of 
power within the fIrm. If I am right about the usual efficiency of grease over 
grit, its power rarely will be great. Simple demands of adherence because of 
the rightness of the cause are unlikely to provoke a cooperative response among 
those who disagree on (perhaps self-serving) principled grounds. 108 That is bad 
negotiation, though a tactic that comes naturally to many lawyers. It leads to 
reactive devaluation. A good negotiator knows how to leverage the 
104. Id. at 499. 
105. Id. at 51~17. 
106. See, e.g., ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 17-55 
(1993) (discussing reciprocation as a major psychological method used to gain compliance from 
others). 
107. Id. at 57 -Ill (citing the use of the natural desire to be seen as consistent as a tool that 
can cause changes in self-image and in attitude both in the marketplace and in political 
philosophy). 
108. See Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et aI., Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based 
Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions, 27 ACAD. MGT. REv. 41, 43-47 (2002) 
(discussing problems raised in negotiations caused by different initial moral and ideological 
positions in a personal and institutional context). 
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legitimacy of what she is claiming and find ways of reducing, if not 
eliminating, the coercive message in a demand. 
In sum, diversity is something that typically has to be sold to other interest 
groups within the finn, some of which will be resistant for the reasons 
discussed. The sales pitch has to be devised so as to minimize the threat of 
disempowennent. One tried technique, of course, is to characterize diversity as 
plainly good for productivity, whether or not the empirical reality clearly 
supports the inference. Holding out the promise that these returns, once they 
arrive, will be broadly shared-even if invoking something of an illusion-
might be the kind of message that would work by increasing the perceived size 
of the profits pie. The kind of co-optation that can be practiced on senior 
management might also be effective as applied to potential sources of resistance 
at lower levels in the organization. Key groups, one small step at a time, could 
be brought into the planning and implementation of diversity initiatives in such 
a way that they would be credited for lowering their resistance, and in the 
process, giving them a psychological stake in the program's success. These 
techniques are well known in the human resources and organizational behavior 
literature and presumably taught to professionals in those fields. I will leave 
their elaboration to others who know them better. My point here is that they 
also have both a legal compliance and a corporate governance function, once 
we see both compliance and governance through the wide-angled lens of the 
theory of the finn. In other words, they illustrate well an area that can be 
understood much better by merging learning from both corporate governance 
and human resources. 
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